Abstract-Preestablished secret keys are often used to encrypt and decrypt data in communication systems, which are not secure once the keys are compromised. One desirable method is to generate secret keys dynamically using correlated channel measurements. We explore this concept in underwater acoustic (UWA) channels, and present a protocol that can generate secret keys dynamically based on the channel frequency response (CFR) in orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing systems. The multibit quantization is carried out on the amplitude of each tone, and the Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem codes are used for information reconciliation. Part of the protocol was implemented in lake tests, and multiple data sets were collected. The lake test results verify that the amplitude of CFR can be used as a randomness source for key generation in UWA channels, and we also find the low correlation between the mutual channels of the legitimate users. Based on the lake test results, we incorporate two modules into the protocol for performance improvement. The first module employs the adaptively weighted probing signaling to increase the channel correlation, and the second module of blocksliced key verification is used to deal with channel dynamics and increase the key agreement probability. The simulation results demonstrate the improved performance of the enhanced protocol.
authority, and the key predistribution schemes are not suitable for large-scale networks [4] . One area of active research is on dynamic key generation at the physical layer to provide secure communications for wireless systems [3] , [4] .
A. Key Generation in Wireless Radio Communications
Based on the reciprocity of the wireless channels between two legitimate users, various key generation protocols have been explored in wireless radio communications.
• The power variation of received signal strength (RSS) has been adopted for key generation in flat fading channels. The received signal strength indicators (RSSI) for many off-the-shelf wireless devices can be easily assessed. Smart antenna with beam-forming technique was used to create artificially fluctuant channels by adjusting the reactance randomly, leading independent RSSI for key generation [5] . A level-crossing algorithm with one-bit quantization to extract keys from the RSSI of correlated Rayleigh fading wireless channels was proposed in [6] . A multi-bit quantization of the RSSI can increase the secret key rates [7] . The framework in [8] used interpolation within the coherence time to deal with the nonsimultaneous measurements of RSSI. Both the absolute amplitude and fading trend of RSSI were multi-bit quantized to address group secret key generation in star and chain topologies [9] .
• The dominant channel taps of a channel impulse response (CIR) can be used as the randomness source for key generation. The complex channel coefficients are employed to extract secret keys by taking advantage of the multipath fading randomness [10] . The impact of the channel sparsity and the correlation between the main and eavesdropping channels on secret key capacity was studied in [11] , and the secret key capacity with/without eavesdropper were presented. The phase information of multipath was considered for key generation in [12] , and the optimal guard intervals were derived to separate quantization regions.
• Multicarrier modulation, such as orthogonal frequencydivision multiplexing (OFDM), is widely used in broadband communication systems. It can provide higher secrecy key rates by utilizing the channel frequency response (CFR). The key bits were quantized from the channel response of each individual subcarrier in [13] . As shown in [14] - [17] , the key bits can be quantized across all the subcarriers. An adaptive key generation approach was proposed in [14] based on the RSS of subcarriers in an OFDM system, where Discrete Cosine Transformation (DCT) was used to reduce the redundancy of the measured RSS and inverse DCT was used for RSS reconstruction, and adaptive multi-level quantization was carried out by exchanging parity information. In [15] , both the real and imaginary parts of CFRs were used for key generation, where the original and conjugate of the received probing signals were exchanged for channel estimation. To achieve a higher secret rate, a Channel Gain Complement (CGC) assisted secret key generation protocol was proposed in [16] based on the fine-grained channel frequency response in an OFDM system, where the non-reciprocal components of CFRs were transmitted to enhance the correlation. The work in [17] proposed a fast secret key extraction protocol named KEEP based on the amplitude of CFRs, where the universal hash functions were used to validate the consistency of keys, and the correlation of near-by subcarriers was eliminated by key combination after random bit-selection. The precoding matrix index (PMI)-based secret key generation with a rotation matrix was proposed for MIMO-OFDM systems in [18] , where the randomly generated keys were embedded in transmitted signals as the index of the best procoding matrix, and the keys from both sides were exchanged secretly.
B. Scope and Contributions of This Paper
In this paper, we study dynamic key generation at the physical layer to provide secure underwater acoustic communications. The research topics in underwater acoustic systems often lag behind the counterparts in wireless radio systems. However, there exists large room for exploration, due to the fundamental difference of underwater acoustic channels from radio channels. Due to the slow speed of sound in water, 1500 m/s versus the speed of radio 3 · 10 8 m/s, the underwater acoustic channel is characterized of large propagation delay, low bandwidth, and severe Doppler effects due to the platform motion and media instability. We are motivated to investigate whether the physical layer techniques developed for radio channels are applicable to underwater acoustic systems.
Note that the importance of security concerns in underwater acoustic systems have been articulated in recent overview papers [19] , [20] . However, up to now only one work has investigated the secret key generation in UWA channels by exploring RSSI [21] .
The contributions of this paper are as follows. 1) We present a secret key generation protocol, which exploits the channel frequency response of OFDM systems in UWA channels. Leveraging the detailed channel information in the frequency domain, the proposed approach will greatly speed up the key generation process relative to RSSI based approaches [21] as more bits are generated in each round of message exchange. We have implemented part of the protocol in lake tests. By analyzing the collected data sets, we verify the correlation between mutual channels, and validate the effectiveness of the key generation approach. 2) Based on the lake test results, we further improve the key generation protocol in UWA systems, by introducing the adaptive pilot signalling module to increase the correlation and the block-sliced key verification module to deal with channel dynamics. The simulation results show the feasibility of higher practical key generation rate. To our knowledge, the concept of adaptive pilot signalling has not been explored in the literature. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model and the secret key generation protocol using fixed pilots. Section III presents the lake test results. Section IV discusses the improved secret key generation protocol utilizing adaptive pilots for signalling. Simulation results are provided in Section V. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section VI.
Notation II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The system configuration is shown in Fig. 1(a) . Two nodes, Alice and Bob, aim to establish a secret key. Eve is the adversary who listens to the communications between Alice and Bob passively, and hopes to extract the same key. Fig. 1(b) illustrates a relevant scenario in an underwater network, where Bob acts as a data collection center and Alice, an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), collects data samples to be sent back to Bob. Eve is another AUV who wants to intercept the data from Alice by listening to the underwater acoustic transmissions between Alice and Bob. 
A. System Model
Alice and Bob use the zero-padded OFDM block as the probing signal for channel estimation [22] 
where K is the number of subcarriers and is assumed to be even, and η[k] contains the ambient noise and intercarrier interference (ICI) [22] . Using the matrix-vector notation, the compact form of (1) is
where z, s and η denote the measurements from all subcarriers, transmitted symbols and noise vector respectively, and H is a diagonal matrix with H [k] being its kth diagonal element. As Fig. 1(a) shows, if Alice and Bob exchange the probing signals in turn, they would get the noisy observations
where H BA is the channel matrix from Bob to Alice, and H AB from Alice to Bob. And Eve will observe
where H AE and H BE are the channels from Alice and Bob to Eve respectively. Since Eve stays multiplewavelengths away from Alice and Bob, 1 she experiences different multipath channels, leading independent channel measurements.
B. Secret Key Generation Protocol
The secret key generation protocol used in lake tests is shown in Fig. 2 . The description here is based on the used AquaSeNT OFDM modem [23] , where three existing functionalities are called by the higher-layer protocol. First, the modem can send out a message using its data transmission mode with its own proprietary data processing algorithms [23] . Second, the modem can play a pre-loaded arbitrary waveform using its waveplay function. Third, the modem can record the incoming signal once properly configured by a command. The procedure is as follows.
1) Alice first sends out a short message that contains the packet number, using the data transmission mode of the modem. Then she plays a known probing signal (for example, one fixed OFDM block in our tests) using the waveplay function of the modem. Once Bob has decoded the packet number correctly and records the probing signal from Alice completely, he replies to Alice with the same probing signal immediately, and then sends out the corresponding packet number he decoded. The packet number here is used for Alice and Bob to pair the probing signal due to the packet loss. Bob sends the packet number after the probing signal, to reduce the interval between the probing signals and provide the highest correlation between mutual channels. 2) Alice quantizes her observation of the underwater acoustic channel in the frequency domain, and generates the keys herself. Then she sends the syndrome to Bob based on the error correction code they predefine, aiming to help Bob recover the sequences that Alice observed. Bob quantizes his channel observation, then he extracts the keys with the help of the quantized channel frequency response available and the received syndrome.
Step 1) and step 2) will repeat N times, until the desired length of keys can be extracted. 3) Bob sends the hash value to Alice where the generated keys are taken as the source of the hash function. Alice generates another hash value with the same hash function, and compares it with the value from Bob. 4) If the hash values of Alice and Bob are equal, the secret keys are regarded as matched and a Key Acknowledgement signal is transmitted to Bob.
C. Channel Estimation
Channel estimation is carried out based on the received data corresponding to the probing signal. We adopt the block fading assumption here, which means that the UWA channel remains quasi-static or slowly varying during probing in each round, but becomes independent from round to round. For this reason, we drop the index for the signal probing at different rounds. For each received probing signal, proper Doppler compensation is still needed to compensate the effect due to platform motion and medium instability. After Doppler compensation, the equivalent channel at the baseband can be represented as [22] 
where N pa is the number of paths, ξ p and τ p are the amplitude and delay of the pth path, respectively. The channel frequency response of the kth subcarrier can be expressed as
Based on the channel model, sparse recovery algorithms with data-driven sparsity learning introduced in [22] are used to estimate the channel frequency response.
D. Channel Quantization
Quantization converts channel measurements into a binary bit stream; see e.g., [24] , [25] on the descriptions of different quantization methods used for key generation. In this paper, we focus on the quantization method based on the cumulative distribution function (CDF).
The channel frequency responses of successive frequencies may have high correlation, resulting long runs of zeros or ones after quantization. To reduce the correlation, we only select parts of the equal-spaced frequency response. Suppose that Different from [16] and [17] which estimate the mean and variance of the amplitudes of CFR samples in a time sequence, we estimate the mean and variance of the amplitudes of CFRs across subcarriers. Then the mean and variance of the amplitudes of CFR are estimated as:
The multi-bit CDF based quantization is used to quantize the amplitude of CFR into binary bits, where the threshold of different quantization intervals is set based on the CDF of the amplitudes of CFR. Suppose that we would like to extract t bits per measurement, then the amplitude of each subcarrier will be divided into 2 t equally likely regions. The CDF of
The lth threshold to space different intervals can be determined by the inverse of the CDF,
Gray coding is constructed and mapped to different inter-
, then the corresponding t-bit code will be used as the extracted bits. As in [9] and [16] , we adopt the Gaussian CDF for the quantizer, i.e., assuming that the CFR amplitudes follow the
Note that only one-bit and two-bit quantizers are used in this paper, where for the one-bit quantizer, the CFR amplitudes are simply compared against the mean value.
E. Key Reconciliation
Let y A and y B denote the binary codewords obtained at Alice and Bob, respectively, from their quantized versions of the channel frequency response. Due to noise and channel time variation, these two codewords are not identical. A reconciliation process can be carried out by error correction coding along the principle of Slepian-Wolf coding [26] . Assume a linear block code such as the BCH(n, m) is used, where n is the length of codeword and m is the length of information word. If the length of y A and y B is larger than n, the bit sequences used for key extraction are collected in an interleaving manner to make the length of each subset equals to n, and then cascade the bits of each subset to get the final key. As an example where the length of y A is n, the process is as follows. 
and
3) Alice sends the helper information r A to Bob through the public channel. The effect of sending r A is equivalent to e A , but r A is preferred due to its shorter length. Though Eve can overhear r A correctly, no information would be leaked to her due to the high uncorrelation of channels. 4) Bob recovers the coset leader e A based on the received syndrome r A . Then it decodes its own key as:
III. LAKE TEST We conducted four lake tests to examine the performance of the secret key generation protocol shown in Fig. 2 . In particular, we took the OFDM modems with single transducer as the nodes to represent Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively. The bandwidth of the AquaSeNT OFDM modems is B = 6 kHz, with the frequency band 14 kHz to 20 kHz, and the number of total subcarriers is K = 1024. Test 1 was the initial test carried out under the Bassetts Bridge of Mansfield Hollow Lake in Connecticut on Aug. 12, 2014. As Fig. 3(a) shows, the length of the bridge was about 17 meters. All three nodes were put near the walls of the bridge ends, where Alice was on the right side of the bridge, while Bob and Eve were on the opposite side, and 2 meters away from each other. They were deployed about 0.8 meter below the surface, with the water depth being 2 to 3 meters. Being close to the bridge, the nodes were deployed without using a boat. The transmission power of Alice and Bob was set to be −25 dB, where 0 dB refers to the maximum transmission power of 25 Watts allowed by the modem.
After examining the outputs from Test 1, three follow-on tests were carried out in the open water at the Mansfield Hollow Lake on Oct. 3, 2014, as shown in Fig. 3(b) , where a boat was used for node deployment. Bob was anchored at a fixed position. In test 2, Alice was 48 meters away from Bob. In test 3, Alice was seperated from Bob with 93 meters. In both tests 2 and 3, Eve was not anchored and floated away with the water flow, and its position was not tracked. In test 4, the distance between Alice and Bob was 179 meters, and Eve was anchored 41 meters away from Bob. In these three tests, Alice and Bob were deployed about 1.5 meters below the water with the transmission power to be −20 dB, and Eve was placed about 1 meter below the water.
In test 1, Alice sent the packet number and the probing OFDM blocks every 10 seconds. In tests 2-4, they exchanged packets every 15 seconds. Note that a typical underwater acoustic channel has a coherence time on the order one to several seconds. Once Bob received the probing signal, he replied immediately with the same probing signal, followed by another message to denote the corresponding packet number. Eve listened passively without any interference. In these tests, the syndrome transmission was not carried out, and off-line processing was conducted on the collected data sets. Due to some synchronization and decoding failure, the probing signals with a correct packet number at Alice, Bob and Eve would be used for key generation. In total, we collected 92 data sets for test 1, 100 sets for test 2, 64 sets for test 3, and 98 sets for test 4.
We use the following metrics to evaluate the performance of the key generation protocol in lake tests.
Bit Match Rate (BitMR): It is defined as the ratio of the number of matched bits to the total number of extracted bits between two parties. The BitMR between Alice and Bob demonstrates the reliability and efficiency for key generation, and the best case is BitMR = 100%. The BitMR between Alice and Eve shows the leaked information. When BitMR = 50%, the best strategy for Eve to crack the key is by random guess.
Burst Match Rate (BurstMR):
The BurstMR is the match rate of bursts, by comparing the secret bits extracted from the 64 subcarrier measurements of each burst.
Randomness: The randomness reveals the distribution pattern of bit streams. The standard NIST statistical Test Suite [27] will be used for the randomness measurement of the keys.
A. Why Amplitudes of CFR?
The amplitude and phase information of channel frequency response (CFR) has been used for key generation in ground wireless communications, respectively [16] , [17] . The real part and imaginary part of CFR are also explored and tested for key generation [15] . However, the reciprocity of UWA channel is seldom investigated. Due to the time-varying property, the random sources used in wireless communication may not be applied to that in UWA channels. Assume that impulse responses of the legitimate channels measured at Alice and Bob are identical. However, the data acquisition has some delays due to the imperfect synchronization of OFDM modems. A time delay introduces phase rotation in the frequency domain. It is hard to correct the difference of the time delays at two distributed nodes, unless for example the estimates of the channel impulse response could be collected by a central processing unit for time alignment. As a result, the correlation between the CFRs of the mutual channels is very low. It could be worse in half-duplex communication systems by considering the time-varying UWA channels and the channel estimation errors. On the other hand, the amplitude correlation is not affected by the time delay, which could provide more robust performance. Next we verify the reciprocity of the collected UWA channel estimates by the correlation coefficients between CFR amplitudes. Fig. 4 shows an example plot of the amplitudes of the channel impulse responses for lake test 3. (The delay channel spread is about τ ds = 20 ms, leading to τ ds B = 120 channel taps in the baseband, while typical radio multipath channels tend to have much less channel taps in the baseband.) Fig. 5 shows an example plot of the cross correlation results of the amplitudes of CFR from lake test 3. We verify that the correlation between real or imaginary parts of CFRs is low, but not shown here due to the limited space. If the amplitudes of the CFR are used to compute the correlation coefficients, from Fig. 5(a) we can see that the diagonal is rather clear, and the average correlation coefficient between the CFR amplitudes of legitimate channels is 0.62. Meanwhile, Fig. 5(b) shows that the average correlation coefficient of the CFR amplitudes between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropped channel is about 0.19. Since the correlation coefficient between the legitimate users is larger than that between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, we expect that secret keys could be extracted from the CFR amplitudes.
B. Channel Quantization
The channels between Alice and Bob H AB and H BA , and the channel from Alice to Eve H AE , are used for key extraction. Although the matrices H AB , H BA , and H AE have 1024 diagonal entries corresponding to 1024 subcarriers, we select M = 64 equal-spaced subcarriers for key generation. The channel frequency amplitudes in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 are scaled and shifted with the mean to be 0, and range from −1 to 1. Due to the space limitation, only the 1-bit quantization results of test 2 and test 4 are shown. Fig. 6 (a) and 7(a) show the quantization results of the mutual channel in the frequency domain between Alice and Bob for one realization of the two test scenarios. For the scaled estimated channel in the frequency domain, we can see that they are not the same, but with some fluctuations. The motion of medium and buoys, and the imperfection of the modems also cause the asymmetry on the frequency measurements. Define the hamming distance as the number of different bits between two sequences. The Hamming distance shown in Fig. 6(a) is much larger than that in Fig. 7(a) , since the water depth was rather small, only about 2 meters, and there were lots of tall water plant at the places where Alice and Bob were deployed. The difference between the quantized H AB and H BA is not as obvious as the unquantized estimates. Part of differences are eliminated by quantization. The differences of quantized values only exist when one channel measurement above the threshold while the other below. Fig. 6 (b) and 7(b) show the quantized results of H AB and H AE in the frequency domain. We can see the huge differences not only lie in the scaled channels, but also in the quantized channels. It verifies the low correlation between the legitimate and eavesdropping channels, and implies the feasibility of secret key extraction.
C. Statistical Property of Quantized Channels
The underwater acoustic channel is time-varying. Figs. 8(a) and 9(a) 9(b) show the cumulative probability of Hamming distances for the corresponding channels. It is clear to see the Hamming distances associated with legitimate and eavesdropping channels for test 4 can be separated, and the Hamming distances related to Alice and Bob are smaller than that related to Eve, which verifies the mutual channels have higher correlation, and indicates the possibility to extract secret keys from the channel frequency response between H AB and H BA . While for quantized H AB and H AE , the mean values increase to about 30 with the standard deviation to be about 4.7, which indicates the lack of correlation between the quantized H AB and H AE .
D. Secret Bits Per Burst
The number of secret bits per burst is determined by the BCH code and the quantization level used in the key generation protocol. The number of secret bits extracted from the BCH code equals to the number of information bits. Since the error correction capability of BCH(n, m) code is discrete, only limited options are available. For each round of information exchange, the number of secret bits can be expressed as
where q is the number of quantized bits per subcarrier, and q ∈ {1, 2}. The BCH codes used in this paper is shown as Fig. 10 . The number of secret key bits ranges from are 1 to 56 per burst.
E. Performance Evaluation
Two quantization types are considered for performance comparison. They are listed as: (i) 1-bit quantization; (ii) 2-bit quantization. We take the results of test 3 as an example to show the impact of quantization. From Fig. 11 we can see that when 64 quantized bits are used for secret key extraction each time, 1-bit quantization provides higher BurstMR and BitMR than 2-bit quantization, since 1-bit quantization has better error tolerance than 2-bit quantization but with the price of smaller key generation rate. The BitMR between legitimate user and eavesdropper stays around 0.5 for the two quantization methods, which is a desirable outcome for key generation. (31, 11) and BCH (15, 5) . Fig. 12 shows the performance of all the 4 lake tests under the 2-bit quantization. We can see the BurstMR between legitimate users in test 4 are almost 100% even when the key rate is up to 12 bits per 64 quantized bits, while it falls to 40% when the key rate is 28. The BitMR is quite close to 95% even when the key rate is 28, which indicates only small portion of key bits are mismatched in test 4. The BurstMR between the legitimates and Eve drops from 30% to zero quickly, and the corresponding BitMR are around 50%, which implies that Eve can eavesdrop the secret key hardly. For tests 1-3, the BurstMRs drop from around 95% to around 10% quickly as the key rate increases to 20. The BitMRs fall from around 95% to around 75% as the key rate rises to 28. It indicates the importance to select a proper BCH code for key extraction, since the location of nodes and the environments have a great impact on the BurstMR and BitMR.
Remark 1: From Fig. 11(a) we can see that when the amplitude of CFR is used for key generation and 22 secret bits are extracted from 64 quantized bits, the corresponding BurstMR is larger than that when 20 secret bits are extracted. It is consistent with the different error correction capability where the corresponding BCH codes are BCH
Remark 2: From Fig. 12 
F. Randomness Test
The randomness is a vital metric for the secrecy of keys. The NIST statistical Test Suite provided in [27] is used to test the randomness of keys generated after information reconciliation and privacy amplification. (Note that on-line entropy estimation with the NIST test suite is possible, see e.g., [28] , which is out of the scope of this paper.) If the p-value for a test is greater than 0.01, the generated keys pass the randomness test. In this subsection, we generate keys by using the BCH (15, 5) code for the randomness test. The collected data are limited; e.g., with the BCH(15,5) code, we have 64/15 × 5 × 2× 100 = 4000 bits extracted from test 2. Note that the whole NIST suite provides 15 tests. Some of the tests require a much longer bit sequence to perform a valid test. Here we only choose 9 tests as shown in Table I . We adopt the SHA-1 hash function to increase the randomness, and assume all the generated 128-bit keys can pass the key verification. Table I lists 9 kinds of test results for all the four lake tests. In all of the tests, we divided each bit sequence into multiple streams. If there's no specific requirement, 10 data streams are used. If there is a recommend value (minimum or maximum) on the block size, the recommended value is used, which leads to more than 10 data streams. The p-value shown in the table is the aggregated result from the p-values of the available streams. We can see most of the p-values are larger than 0.01, indicating that the generated keys pass the randomness test.
IV. PROTOCOL IMPROVEMENT
The lake test results shown in Section III indicate that when Alice and Bob transmit the probing signal directly, the BurstMR and BitMR are quite low when the correlation of mutual channels is low and a high key rate is desired. The level crossing scheme proposed in [6] and [7] made the confirmation of key agreement by exploiting the authentication code generated from the secret message. The hash values are used to confirm the key agreement in [5] , [17] , and [29] . (15, 5) However, the short length of keys leads the key to be cracked easily by exhaustive computation, and longer keys result in low key agreement rate. e.g. when BitMR is 0.95 and the desired key length is 128, the key agreement probability is as low as 0.95 128 = 1.4 · 10 −3 . So the aforementioned key verification methods fall short of direct practical use. The improved secret key generation protocol utilizing adaptive pilots to probe the channels and sliced blocks for key verification is shown in Fig. 13 . The procedure is similar to the protocol using fixed pilots shown in Fig. 2 , but with some differences:
1) In the channel probing phase, instead of replying the known probing signal, Bob forwards a weighted probing signal and the decoded packet number to Alice. 2) In the channel estimation phase, Alice estimates the virtual channel between her and Bob in the frequency domain, rather than the direct channel between them. 3) Step 1) and step 2) will repeat N times, until the desired length of secret bits are obtained. Then the secret bits will be divided into multiple blocks of the same size. Bob generates the hash value of each block, and feeds back the first half of the hash value to Alice in the public channel for key confirmation. Alice compares the received hash values to the bits she generates under the same rule. 4) Alice checks the match of the feedback bits to verify the agreement of keys, and then marks the success and failure of each check. Then Alice sends back the indexes of the matched blocks and the hash values of the overall key bits. If the hash values are the same as that generated by Bob, a key acknowledgement signal will be transmitted to Alice through public channel.
A. Adaptively Weighted Probing Signalling
Suppose that Alice transmits a probing signal s A to Bob. After Bob receives the probing signal, he estimates the channel from Alice to Bob asĤ AB . Instead of transmitting the fixed probing signal s B , Bob weights the probing signal by the conjugate of the estimated channelĤ AB . The probing signal sent out by Bob has frequency-domain components as
The phase conjugation operation in (17) is motivated by the phase conjugation techniques (also known as time reversal) used for temporal focusing of underwater acoustic channels; see e.g., [30] , [31] . Since the channel is changing from round to round, the adaptively generated probing signals would be different at different rounds. Alice and Eve would observẽ
Bob can get the estimated channelĤ AB from the probing signals and observations. Since Alice only has the shared pilot information, she can estimate the weighted channelĤ * AB H BA through channel estimation where the Least Squares channel estimator is used [22] . The estimated weighted channel from Bob to Alice is here expressed asH BA for clarity.
As discussed in Section III-A that only the amplitude of CFR will be used for key generation in UWA channels, and the phase information will be ignored. If the channel is perfectly reciprocal, then |Ĥ BA | at Alice is identical to |Ĥ * AB | at Bob. If the mutual channels are not reciprocal but correlated, the virtual CFR on the kth subcarrier between Bob and Alice, as estimated at Alice, is
If |Ĥ BA [k]| at Alice is smaller than |Ĥ * AB [k]| at Bob, due to the square root function of the multiply of the two estimated channels, we would have
which means
and we have the same conclusion that Note that Eve has the option of generating the keys from H AE or fromĤ BE . The correlation of CFR amplitudes between H AB andĤ AE is not affected by adaptive probing, but the correlation of CFR amplitudes betweenĤ AB andĤ BE might increase when Bob's probing signal incorporates part of the channel information fromĤ AB . The advantage and disadvantage of adaptive probing will be evaluated in Section V where Eve generates the keys withĤ BE .
B. Block-Sliced Key Verification
Although the error correction code BCH(n, m) can reduce the bit mismatch rate, the legitimate users still need to check the agreement of keys at both parties. Otherwise, the bit stream cannot be used as secret keys. In this paper, we introduce the block-sliced key verification module to handle the channel dynamics, which uses part of hash values of the extracted information code words to verify the consistency of keys.
After N rounds of mutual communication, Alice and Bob collect m N consecutive secret bits. The m N bits will be sliced into N bl blocks of size N s , where
For each block, Bob computes the corresponding 128-bit hash value by using the SHA-1 hash function, and the first N s bits of the hash value will be kept as effective bits since the last 128 − N s bits are redundant as keys. The first N f bits of the effective bits will be fed back to Alice for key agreement verification. Alice generates the hash value of each block with the same criteria as Bob. Then she compares the first N f -bit hash value to her received hash value block by block. If they are matched, Alice can claim she and Bob share the same block information, and the indexes of the matched blocks will be recorded. Meanwhile, the remaining N s − N f bits will be kept as the keys. If all the N s -bit long sequences are of equal probability, the block mismatch probability between legitimate users is 1 − 1 2 Ns −N f . Obviously, the longer N f is, the lower the false match rate is, but the key generation rate decreases too.
To make sure that the key is hard to crack computationally, the desired length of the final key N k should be long enough. Alice cascades the short keys from the blocks that pass the match check. Once the accumulative key length is larger than N k , Alice will truncate the first N k bits, and send both the indexes of the corresponding matched blocks and the hash value of the final key to Bob. Bob concatenates the secret keys from the matched blocks, and derive the corresponding hash values. Then he compares the hash values from himself to that from Alice. At last Bob will send a key acknowledgement to Alice, to inform her whether the final keys passed the check or not. While Eve would extract keys based on the overheard indexes of matched blocks, regardless of the match of the feedback bits to her observation. 
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
The parameters of the ZP-OFDM communication system considered for simulation are as follows: center frequency f c = 13 kHz, bandwidth B = 9.77 kHz, symbol duration T = 104.86 ms, guard interval T g = 24.6 ms. The ZP-OFDM system has K = 1024 subcarriers in total. The simulated UWA channel has 15 discrete paths. The inter-arrival time of paths is exponentially distributed with mean of 1 ms, resulting a 15-ms channel delay spread on average. The amplitude of each path follows Rayleigh distribution with an exponential power decay profile, and the attenuation difference between the beginning and end of the guard time is 20 dB [22] . The UWA channels are assumed to follow block fading, and the Doppler effect is not considered. A total of 1000 Monte Carlo runs are carried out for key generation.
Assume that the path delays of Alice and Bob are the same. Define h A,l and h B,l as the lth channel coefficient of Alice and Bob, respectively. Assume that [h A,l h B,l ] T follows the correlated complex Gaussian distribution
where ρ is the correlation coefficient. Then the correlated lth channel coefficient can be modeled as
where h A,l and ζ l follow independent complex Gaussian distributed with CN (0, σ 2 h ). Note that 
A. Metrics
Besides the metrics introduced in Section III, we add one more metric, average key length, to evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol with adaptive pilots and block-sliced key verification. The average key length is defined as the key rate agreed between legitimate users per channel probing, which equals the number of matched blocks times the number of secret keys per block, then divided by 1000 (the number of rounds):
The average key length as in (26) is the common metric that has been used in [14] , [16] , [17] , and [8] to show the key generation speed. Compared to the number of secret bits in Section III-D, the average key length as in (26) reflects the number of bits per channel probing after considering the impact of information reconciliation and key verification. Note that the average key length as in (26) only describes the shared key rate that legitimate users can agree per channel probing, but it does not account for the potential information leakage to Eve. Basically, the secrecy rate is the difference between the mutual information on legitimate channels and the eavesdropping channel [32] - [34] , and the maximal secrecy rate is the achievable secrecy capacity [35] . Inspired by the definition of the secrecy capacity in [35] and the entropy of the final key in [36] , we revise the definition of the average key length, by taking into account the difference of the entropy on the key bits of the legitimate nodes and eavesdropper as follows.
Denote the binary bits at Alice, Bob and Eve as b A , b B and b E , respectively. The rate of the secret key bits between legitimate users and eavesdropper can be expressed as 2 [35] , [36] :
Since b A = b B after key verification, (27) can be simplified to
Expanding (28), we have
The joint probability p(b A = i, b E = j ) and conditional probability p(b A = i |b E = j ) can be derived from the data for offline analysis. Then the average key length with N blk blocks that passed the match check is computed as
Since r s ∈ [0, 1], one has L 2 ≤ L 1 , where the equality holds when no information is leaked to Eve. 
B. Performance Evaluation
In the simulation, we set the channel correlation coefficient between Alice and Bob to be ρ = 0.5, and the channel correlation coefficient between legitimate users and Eve to be zero. (The case with ρ = 0 for the channels between Alice and Bob is also tested and not reported here as the observations are similar.) The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of each channel is 20 dB. The 2-bit quantization across subcarriers in frequency domain is taken as an example to show the performance. The block size is set to be N s = 28, and the number of feedback bits is N f = 14. So Alice hashes the 28 secret bits, and feedback 14 bits to Bob for key verification, and the remaining 14 bits may be kept as keys if the match check is passed. Fig. 14 shows the simulation results of the key generation protocol using fixed or adaptive pilots with/without key verification, respectively. If the key verification process is not carried out, the BlockMR is the match rate of blocks between two parties. If the key verification is adopted, the BlockMR is the ratio of the number of the matched blocks compared to the number of the check-passed blocks, which reflects the correct check rate. We can see that both the BlockMR and BitMR under the protocol using adaptive pilots shows better performance over the protocol using fixed pilots. If key verification is used, the BlockMR and BitMR between legitimate users can increase to 100%, and the protocol using adaptive pilots is more robust than the protocol using fixed pilots even when 28 secret bits can be extracted per 64 quantized bits, which indicates the effectiveness of the improved key verification approach. If the match check is not carried out, the improvement of BlockMR and BitMR under the protocols using fixed pilots and adaptive pilots decrease gradually as the key rate grows. The protocol using adaptive pilots will leak some information to Eve especially when the key rate is low. However, the leakage (BlockMR and BitMR between legitimate users and Eve) decreases as the key rate increases, which implies that the protocol using adaptive pilots enhances the potential to increase the BlockMR, BitMR and key rate without leaking any information. Fig. 15 shows the average key length per round under the scheme of fixed and adaptive pilots. For the average key length as defined in (26), we can see that L 1 using fixed pilots stays around 0.5. The protocol using adaptive pilots provides larger L 1 than that using fixed pilots, since more blocks can pass the match check in the key verification phase when the weighted probing signalling is used. As more secret bits can be extracted per 64 quantized bits, the average key length increases at the beginning due to a higher amount of matched blocks, and then drops because of the lower error correction ability of BCH codes used and less matched blocks.
For the average key length L 2 as defined in (30), we can see that when 1 secret bit is extracted per 64 bits, the protocol using adaptive pilots has a smaller average key length than that using fixed pilots, since some of the agreed keys between Alice and Bob are leaked to Eve. However, as more secret bits can be generated per 64 bits which means less information are leaked to Eve, the average key length increases to 6 bits which indicates the advantage of the key generation protocol using adaptive pilots, while the average key length with fixed pilots stays around 0.5 bit.
For the protocol with fixed pilots, we can see the average key length under different definitions are nearly the same, since the eavesdropping channel is uncorrelated to the legitimate channel. For the protocol with adaptive pilots, 
C. Randomness Test
We use the NIST statistical Test Suite to test the randomness of keys which are generated by using three different kinds of BCH codes under the protocol using adaptive pilots. Table II shows the corresponding p-values of the nine tests. We can see all the p-values are larger than 0.01, indicating that the keys pass the randomness test successfully.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first presented a secret key generation approach which uses fixed pilots to probe the UWA channel. The multi-bit quantization is carried out based on the statistical information across subcarriers, and the channel frequency responses of UWA channels are used for key extraction. The lake test results verified the reciprocity and randomness of the amplitudes of UWA channel frequency responses, and demonstrated that secret key generation is achievable by selecting proper error correction codes. However, the low correlation between mutual channels showed in the lake tests hinders a higher bit match rate when more secret bits are desired. To improve the bit match rate and make the secret key generation approach more practical, we proposed an improved key generation approach, which uses weighted forward probing signalling to improve the correlation of channel frequency response, and adopts the sliced-block key verification approach to deal with the channel dynamics. Simulation results show that our proposed approach has better bit match rate, and longer key length when less information is leaked during the reconciliation phase.
